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Production Incentives from Static Decoupling: Entry, Exit and Use Exclusion Restrictions 
 
Since the signing of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement and Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), there has been an increase in the use of infra-marginal 
support and other decoupled policies. Many member nations have replaced coupled agricultural 
support policies, in which farmers receive a per unit subsidy granted to every unit of production, 
with support policies that are not tied directly to current prices, yields or input use in order to 
comply with obligations outlined in the AOA. These new decoupled policies are thought to be 
less production and trade distorting than predecessor programs. 
Close examination of OECD data reported in annual monitoring reports (e.g., OECD 
2007) shows an increase in infra-marginal agricultural support, such as countercyclical 
payments, payment limits per farm, payments based on a limited amount of output or inputs 
(e.g., land or animal numbers), production quotas, and historical entitlements, since the signing 
of the AOA. During this same time period, total producer support declined. In 1986 support to 
farmers in OECD countries accounted for 39 percent of the farmers‘ gross receipts, by 2007 this 
figure had fallen to just 23 percent (OECD 2008). In contrast, infra-marginal support is 
becoming increasingly prevalent as member nations attempt to move domestic support from the 
most trade distorting classification, or the Amber Box, to the Green and Blue Boxes, 
classification designated for minimally or less trade distortive policies. Infra-marginal support 
accounted for just 30 percent of total producer support in 1986 and 37 percent of total producer 
support by 2001 (OECD 2008).   
However, recent research has shown that infra-marginal subsidies can distort production. 
The key factor is cross-subsidization where subsidies on a production base indirectly finance   3 
losses on all over base production sold at world market prices (de Gorter, Just and Kropp 2008). 
Cross-subsidization occurs when world market prices are below the firm‘s average cost of 
production. Moreover, cross-subsidization is driven by declining average costs; as the farm 
expands its production beyond the base amount, the average unit cost of production declines. 
This decline of per unit costs combined with the higher prices received on infra-marginal 
production allows production at the extra-marginal level to become profitable, even though this 
extra-marginal output is sold below the average cost of producing it. In addition to the trade 
distortion resulting from extra-marginal production, infra-marginal support leads to exit 
deterrence since some farms would not produce absent the infra-marginal support. This generates 
an additional source of production distortion.   
Although the WTO legal texts do not address the potential trade distorting effects of 
infra-marginal policies, Dispute Settlement Bodies (DSB) of two recent WTO cases involving 
EU sugar and Canadian dairy ruled infra-marginal support programs violated the countries‘ 
obligations under the AOA on the grounds of cross-subsidization (WTO 2002, 2004 ). However, 
at that time, with the exception of Tangermann (1997), there had been no economic analysis of 
cross-subsidization in the literature. The DSB were silent about the effects of infra-marginal 
support on decisions to exit and determined the distortion to be only the extra-marginal output, 
that is, output beyond the quota. 
The de Gorter, Just and Kropp (2008) article presents empirical evidence of the various 
sources of output distortion with cross-subsidization by evaluating infra-marginal subsidies for 
U.S. dairy farmers. Results show that output distortions due to infra-marginal subsidies are 
significant and close to that of a fully coupled subsidy in the short run. Theoretically, it is 
possible that infra-marginal support is more output distorting than an equivalent fully coupled   4 
subsidy. In addition, they show that production distortions due to exit deterrence are much higher 
than the extra-marginal output distortion analyzed by the WTO. 
The issues of cross-subsidies and exit deterrence center around infra-marginal support 
where farms receive higher revenue on only a limited amount of output. This is exactly the case 
for U.S. direct payments notified in the Green Box. In 1996, the United State enacted the Federal 
Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR), known as the Agricultural Market 
Transition Act (AMTA) which introduced Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC). This 
decoupled direct payment program was designed to replace the old system of coupled prices 
supports and was to be phased-out prior to the subsequent Farm Bill. The FAIR Act both 
combated rising costs associated with maintaining existing coupled price support programs and 
honored commitments outlined in the AOA. Through the PFC program, operators receive 
payments based on historical base acres and yields regardless of current plantings. Hence, these 
decoupled payments are not tied to current production, prices or inputs. Yet, operators are 
required to comply with several regulations to remain eligible for the payments, namely, the land 
tied to base acres must be kept in good agricultural use and base acres cannot be used in the 
production of specialty crops such as fruits and vegetables. Emergency legislation in 1998-2001 
awarded additional Market Loss Assistance (MLA) payments, a form of counter-cyclical 
payment, to recipients of PFC payments essentially doubling the support they received.  The 
2007 Farm Bill not only continued both PFC and MLA payments but also allowed farmland 
owners to update base acreage and yields upon which their benefits are calculated.  
Since farmers in the US are not formally required to obtain these decoupled payments 
and they do not have to produce to receive the payment, the arguments of cross-subsidization and 
exit deterrence do not apply in a straightforward manner. Nevertheless, there are features of the   5 
U.S. Green Box subsidies that generate cross-subsidization and exit deterrence effects. One can 
identify four different mechanisms whereby U.S. decoupled payments distort production that are 
related to the concepts of cross-subsidization and exit deterrence. These mechanisms are 
discussed in detail in the next section and center around the exclusion restrictions of U.S. direct 
payments. We show that the exclusion restrictions combined with other aspects of the program‘s 
implementation, such as payments accruing to operators, lead to land use distortions and hence 
production distortions over time as the demand for land for the excluded uses increases. 
Therefore, while U.S. direct payments may be ―decoupled‖ in a static analysis, over time, as 
relative profits adjust, these programs eventually become essentially fully coupled. Currently, the 
US is experimenting with removing the fruit and vegetable restriction, due in part to the recent 
WTO case involving U.S. cotton subsidies, but not the non-agricultural uses restriction. The 
arguments of cross-subsidization still hold even if the planting restrictions are removed as long 
as the good agricultural use requirement is maintained. 
In this paper, we show the mechanisms by which such exclusion restrictions can cause 
substantial production effects over time. Furthermore, we show that decoupled payments can be 
more trade distorting than an equivalent fully coupled subsidy. However, we leave the estimation 
of the production distortions attributed to direct payments to future research.  
 
Decoupled Payments and Production 
Early research on decoupled payments and infra-marginal supports concludes when infra-
marginal payments do not affect production decisions on the margin, then these payments have 
no impact on output levels and thus no trade distorting effects (Rucker, Thurman, and Sumner 
1995; Rucker and Thurman 1990; Borges and Thurman 1994; Sumner and Wolf; Blandford, de   6 
Gorter and Harvey 1989).  However, this early research simply looks at infra-marginal payments 
in a static framework ignoring the possibility of cross-subsidization. In addition to cross-
subsidization, there are several other mechanisms through which payments seemingly not tied to 
current production can still provide production incentives.  
These mechanisms include impacting attitudes toward risk; affecting decisions on leisure 
and savings; overcoming credit constraints or other input market imperfections; and changing 
farmer‘s expectations about future government agricultural support policies. Hennessy (1998) 
shows that wealth effects generated by decoupled payments impact attitudes toward risk. Hence, 
decoupled payments can lead to increases in production if the farmer is risk-averse and his 
preferences can be characterized by a decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) utility function. 
Other research has found a positive relationship between decoupled payments and the number of 
on-farm work hours thus likely effecting aggregate production (Burfisher and Hopkins 2004). 
Furthermore, direct payments provide a known stream of cash inflows. These cash inflows serve 
as a verifiable signal of an improvement of the farmer‘s liquidity that might lead lenders to 
perceiving this farmer as more creditworthy (Gonzalez-Vega et al. 2006). Therefore, decoupled 
payments may improve a farmer‘s access to credit or cost of capital.  In addition, uncertainty 
regarding future government policies is likely to influence current production. Goodwin and 
Mishra (2006) assume that farmers maximize their expected utility of wealth and show that 
uncertainty regarding future decoupled payments may affect the optimal allocation of acreage. 
Bhaskar and Beghin (2007) show that policy uncertainty about the possibility of updating the 
number of base acres or yield being allowed in the future has a positive effect on the number of 
acres planted.   7 
Moreover, Chau and de Gorter (2005) demonstrated that while infra-marginal payments 
do not affect production discussions on the margin, they deter producers from exiting the 
industry, thereby distorting aggregate output levels. They argue that since infra-marginal 
payments allow producers to cover fixed costs, this enables some producers to remain in 
business when they would have exited the industry absent the payment. Building on their work, 
de Gorter, Just and Kropp (2008) show that it is actually declining average costs that leads to exit 
deterrence and cross-subsidization. However, the authors assume that farmers must produce in 
order to receive the infra-marginal payments. Therefore, since farmers in the US are not formally 
required to obtain direct payments and they do not have to produce to receive the payments, the 
arguments of cross-subsidization and exit deterrence do not apply to direct payments in a 
straightforward manner. However, one can identify four different mechanisms whereby U.S. 
decoupled payments distort production that have not been identified in the literature to date and 
are all related to the concepts of cross-subsidization and exit deterrence. 
First, land has to be kept in ―good agricultural use‖ for farmers to remain eligible to 
receive direct payments. Therefore, a farmer necessarily incurs fixed costs to comply and so it 
may be optimal to incur variable costs as well. Thus, the decoupled support causes some farmers 
to produce when they otherwise would not. If these fixed costs were not incurred, the most 
profitable option may have been to keep the land idle.   
Second, there is the restriction that no land receiving payments can to be used in the 
production of fruits and vegetables or other specialty crops. Therefore, some land that otherwise 
would be used for fruit and vegetable production now remains in crop production. The effects of 
the combined restrictions of keeping land in ―good agricultural use‖ and not in fruit and 
vegetable production automatically means farmers have to produce to get decoupled payments.   8 
In other words, decoupled payments acts as an infra-marginal subsidy and cross-subsidize crop 
production that otherwise would have been in excludable acreage like fruits and vegetables, 
forest, recreational and other uses.  
Third, the decoupled payment becomes a coupled distortion if over time the demand for 
excludable land expands. This can be shown in Figure 1. Assume that total land is fixed and that 
land is either used in the production of ―allowed‖ crops (includes both base acreage and non-base 
acreage plantings of allowable crops) or ―not allowed‖ (all other uses of land including plantings 
of restricted crops and non-agricultural uses). Initially, before any subsidy, there is equilibrium 
between ―allowed‖ and ―not allowed‖ land uses represented by L* (point a). A decoupled 
subsidy on base acres shifts the demand for land with associated base acres up to D'A, but 
because it is decoupled, land use does not change (the price of ―allowed‖ land goes up by the 
amount of the subsidy). But if over time the demand for ―not allowed‖ land increases (as it has in 
the US), then the observed amount of land in ―allowed‖ uses (crops complying with plating 
restriction) may not change but the new demand for ―not allowed‖ land intersects the demand for 
―allowed‖ land at a higher point (point b) resulting in a higher price for ―not allowed‖ land. 
Consequently, even though observed land use has not changed, there is an unobserved distortion 
in land use since absent the decoupled support more land would be in ―not allowed‖ crops such 
as fruits, vegetables, forests, recreation, or even developed. The unobserved distortion is given 
by the distance L' to L*. 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there are two features of U.S decoupled payments 
that effectively requires farmers to produce in order to get the payments: 1) base acres and 
program yields are updated, and 2) farm operators by law receive payments (not the landowner 
who owns the rights to decoupled payments). The implication of updating is that there is some   9 
positive probability planting additional acres in the current period increases gross receipts in 
future periods. Hence, farmers are acting as if they have to produce to get the payments. The 
implication of the requirement that farm operators receive the payments is that if they do not 
produce, they do not receive any payments. Because recent research has shown that only 20-25 
percent of decoupled payments are capitalized into land rental values (Kirwan 2008), it follows 
that farm operators have every incentive to produce in order to receive the payments. Therefore, 
both features of updating and farm operators receiving the payments automatically make the 
entire decoupled payment a bona fide infra-marginal subsidy for the within ―allowed‖ land 
production decisions.  
U.S. decoupled programs therefore cause production distortions due to cross-
subsidization and exit deterrence effects. In the next section, we model how exclusion 
restrictions can cause substantial production effects over time and ultimately cause the decoupled 
payment to become essentially fully coupled. We also show that in theory these distortions can 
be greater than the distortions resulting from an equivalent amount of money spent on a fully 
coupled subsidy. The outcome is an empirical question, depending on the farm size distribution 
and corresponding cost structures.  
 
A Model of Production Exclusion Restrictions 
Suppose a producer has land represented by the interval  , LL L R, of varying quality. The 
producer must decide on how to divide the land between various competing uses based upon the 
attributes of the land. For simplicity, suppose the attributes of the land can be summarized in a 
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where, n is the chosen number of land plots , and  **
| | | | x x F x F x F x F p y c y  represents the profit 
from using a piece of land for activity xas a function of the land attributes. Here  | xF p  is the price 
per unit of output from activity  x given land quality  F ,  | xF cy  is the cost for producing  y  
units from activity  x given land quality F , and  *
| xF y  solves the standard first order condition  
*
| | | '0 x F x F x F pcy .  Figure 2 represents an example of a choice problem as embodied in (1) 
and (2) with three possible activities. The optimal partition is determined by the intersections of 
the profit functions, or more specifically where the two uppermost profit functions intersect.  
  A fully coupled subsidy could be included in our model by defining an activity specific 
production subsidy for each activity,  x s . In this case, the profit function for each activity is 
redefined as  **
| | | | x x F x x F x F x F p s y c y , thus leading to an increase in  *
| xF y  (the intensive 
margin) and an increase in land devoted to activities with production subsidies (the extensive 
margin). For any specific piece of land, totally differentiating the first order condition with 
respect to the subsidy and production yields  **
| | | 1 '' x F x x F x F dy ds c y , which is positive under 
the standard assumption of a convex cost function. Define  *
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Totally differentiating (3) with respect to the subsidy on activity i and the location of the switch 
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If  i L  is an upper bound on activity i, then the denominator will necessarily be positive, 
increasing the extensive margin. To see this, note that the condition for an upper bound (derived 
by taking the derivative of (3)) is  
(6)
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Alternatively, if  i L  represents a lower bound on the activity, then the sign of (5) will be negative. 
Finally, 
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, which will be positive if profit for activity  x  
increases with F  and negative otherwise. 
  Alternatively, suppose the producer faces a decoupled payment system, so that he 
receives a payment equal to Don all base land upon which he does not engage in excluded uses. 
For simplicity, we suppose that all acres under consideration are allocated to base acreage. The 
policy was created so that all base acres were engaged in allowable uses at the time base acreage 
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where Ais the set of allowable land uses and Dis the decoupled payment. Figure 3 displays the 
profit function for land at the time base acreage is set, supposing only two possible activities. At 
this time, all acres are used in activity 1 due to its dominant profit over activity 2. The decoupled 
payment increases the per acre profit by D causing the profit function to shift up for all land 
attribute values. Because the subsidy is not tied to production, it will not affect the first order 
conditions for production decisions on any base acre. Further, because all base acres are initially 
more profitable in the allowed activities than not allowed, the decoupled payment should not 
induce changes on the extensive margin.    13 
  However, once base acres are determined, the relative profits from allowable and 
unallowable uses may change. Figure 4 depicts the same base acres after a shift in the value of 
the excluded and included uses (e.g., urban development versus corn production). If the value of 
allowable uses declines and/or the value of unallowable uses increases, then the decoupled 
payments begin to substantially influence production choices. For example in Figure 4, under the 
decoupled payment, all land to the left of  1 ' L  will be devoted to the excluded use, while all land 
to the right will be devoted to the allowable use. Without the decoupled payment, this point 
would shift up discretely to  1 L , placing much more land in the excluded use. This is a 
particularly important point given the changing values of land in traditional crops versus fruit 
and vegetables which have been excluded from decoupled payments. Under this scenario the 
decoupled payment will still not impact decisions regarding the intensive margin of production, 
but could substantially impact the extensive margin. 
  The new switch point can be captured by rewriting (3) as 
(9)  **
| | | | i i i i j i j i ij x F L x F L x F L x F L y D y D . 
We can now totally differentiate (9) to determine the impact of the decoupled payment on the 
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. 
 As with (5), the denominator will be positive if  i L  is an upper bound, and negative otherwise. 
Thus, decoupled payments affect land use and lead to production distortions over time. 
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Taxpayer Costs for Equivalent Direct and Decoupled Subsidies 
Decoupled payments were introduced primarily as a way to provide subsidies without distorting 
trade through increased production. While it is useful to note that decoupled payments can create 
incentives for increased production as markets shift, it is important to determine the size and 
costs of these effects. Thus, the purpose of this section is to determine the size of a decoupled 
payment that would be required to increase production to the equivalent of a given direct 
production subsidy and to compare the costs of such programs.  
  To begin our analysis, we define a coupled and decoupled subsidy to be equivalent if they 
result in the same level of total production. In this sense both would distort trade equally. Thus, 
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All values in both the denominator and numerator are positive, as shown earlier. If the impact of 
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or the average level of production for the target good.
 
The derivative in (11) can be less than  y  implying that for the same level of expenditure, 
the decoupled payment is more trade distorting. The simplest example can be found in the case 
where the producer faces constant returns to scale in all non-land inputs, so that  '' 0. Suppose 
further that all land devoted to the admissible activity is contiguous (i.e., all profits for all 
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By the intermediate value theorem, this can be rewritten as 
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i i i i x F L x F L y y y  , or within the interval formed by the level of production on 
the marginal boundaries of production. Clearly, in most reasonable cases, the production level at 
the boundaries will be substantially lower than the average production level. Thus in this case, a 
given level of expenditures on a decoupled subsidy can increase production by more than the 
same level of expenditure when using a direct production subsidy. The intuition is that marginal 
lands will receive a lower subsidy when the payments are tied directly to production. This is 
because these lands provide poor conditions for production and thus cannot easily capture the 
production subsidy. Alternatively, the decoupled payment provides a very large incentive on a 
production basis for the marginal lands. Of course, most decoupled payment policies base 
payments on historical production levels.  
However, the ability to potentially update base acreage or yields provides an incentive to 
increase current plantings on marginal land.  If producers face some positive probability that 
updating will occur, then this may cause the expected present value of planting marginal land in 
the current period to become positive due to the value associated with the possible future stream 
of direct payments. By planting the marginal land in the current period the operator has the 
ability to increase base acreage should updating become an available option.   17 
Since direct payments were introduced in the FAIR Act in 1996, farmers have had the 
opportunity to update both the number of base acres and yields associated with existing base 
acres. The 2002 Farm Bill allowed farmland owners to update program base acres and payment 
yields used to calculate program benefits such as direct and counter-cyclical payments. While the 
2007 Farm Bill does not allow updating, it introduced a new option in which enrolled operators‘ 
benefits are based on moving averages linked to both market prices and yields thus essentially 
inducing the same response from operators as uncertainty regarding updating.    
 
Conclusions 
The use of agricultural infra-marginal support and decoupled payments has been on the rise since 
the inception of the WTO and the signing of the Agreement on Agriculture. However, the effects 
of these policies on production are still unclear.  Many studies have found varying degrees of 
distortion associated with decoupled payments and present a host of mechanism by which 
decoupled payments influence current production including effects on risk attitudes, impacts on 
access to credit and overcoming other imperfect input markets, changing expectations regarding 
future government support policies, and influencing the decision to exit.  
Our analysis contributes to the emerging literature on the production effects of decoupled 
programs. In this paper, we show how exclusion restrictions cause direct payments to become 
infra-marginal and hence arguments of cross-subsidization and exit deterrence are applicable. 
Specifically, we show that the fruit and vegetable restriction and the requirement that land must 
be kept in good agricultural use, combined with other aspects of how direct payments are 
administered such as payments accruing to operators and the possibility of updating,  in essence 
causes the operator to act as if he must produce to receive the payment. In addition, we show that   18 
over time, as relative profits adjust, the restrictions cause the decoupled payment to become fully 
coupled. Therefore, while direct payments may be decoupled in a static analysis, they are 
become coupled over time. 
In addition, we find that the effects of direct payments on production can be substantial. 
Theoretically, it is possible for a decoupled direct payment to be more distortive than a fully 
coupled policy resulting from the same level of taxpayer expenditure. Ultimately, which policy 
option leads to a higher output distortion is an empirical question, depending on the farm size 
distribution and corresponding cost structures. We leave the estimation of output distortions 
associated with U.S. direct payments to future research.  
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Figure 4. Decoupled Payments after 
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